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Substantial changes in population size, age structure, and urbani-
zation are expected in many parts of the world this century.
Although such changes can affect energy use and greenhouse gas
emissions, emissions scenario analyses have either left them out or
treated them in a fragmentary or overly simpliﬁedmanner.We carry
out a comprehensive assessment of the implicationsof demographic
change for global emissions of carbon dioxide. Using an energy–
economic growth model that accounts for a range of demographic
dynamics, we show that slowing population growth could provide
16–29% of the emissions reductions suggested to be necessary by
2050 to avoid dangerous climate change. We also ﬁnd that aging
and urbanization can substantially inﬂuence emissions in particular
world regions.
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Statistical analyses of historical data suggest that populationgrowth has been one driver of emissions growth over the
past several decades (1–3) and that urbanization (2), aging (3),
and changes in household size (2) can also affect energy use and
emissions. Demographers expect major changes in these dimen-
sions of populations over the coming decades (4). Global pop-
ulation could grow by more than 3 billion by mid-century, with
most of that difference accounted for by growing urban pop-
ulations. Aging will occur in most regions, a result of declines in
both fertility and mortality, and is expected to be particularly
rapid in regions like China that have recently experienced sharp
falls in fertility. The number of people per household is also de-
clining as populations age and living arrangements shift away from
multigeneration households toward nuclear families.
Despite these expectations, explicit analysis of the effect of
demographic change on future emissions has been extremely
limited (5). Early exploratory analyses considered only popula-
tion size or total numbers of households (6, 7) and used simple
multiplicative models (8) that did not account for important re-
lationships between population and economic and technological
factors. Furthermore, these early models used little or no regional
disaggregation, an important consideration given that, with some
exceptions including the United States, population growth tends
to be highest where per capita emissions are lowest.
More recently, a large emissions scenario literature (9) has de-
veloped that informs a wide range of climate change analysis
and related policy discussions. Model sophistication and scope has
increased substantially over time. Scenarios typically span time-
scales of decades to centuries, include emissions of multiple gases
and aerosols from a range of sectors, including land use, and
consider a wide range of emissions drivers (10–12). They have been
used to study possible emissions in the absence of mitigation policy
as well as the costs and other consequences of emissions reduction
strategies. Although nearly all scenarios include assumptions
about future population growth, none has explicitly investigated
the separate effect of demographic inﬂuences on emissions, with
the exception of a few studies at the country level (13).
Here, we assess the global implications of demographic change
by developing a set of economic growth, energy use, and emissions
scenarios using an energy–economic growth model, the Pop-
ulation-Environment-Technology model (PET) (13).
Methods
The PET model is a nine-region dynamic computable general
equilibrium model of the global economy with a basic economic
structure that is representative of the state of the art in emissions
scenariomodeling (SI Text has further description and references).
To best capture the effects of future demographic change, we take
an approach based on building principles from demography into
a dynamic economic model by distinguishing among a large
number of household types by household age (deﬁned as age of the
household head), size (number of members), and urban/rural
residence in each region. We draw on data from national surveys
covering 34 countries and representative of 61% of the global
population to estimate key economic characteristics of our house-
hold types. We use these estimates to calibrate parameters in the
PETmodel that represent household demand for consumer goods,
wealth in the base year, and labor supply over time. To test the
effect of demographic change, we develop a set of global house-
hold projections and use these to drive the PETmodel, computing
the associated effects on emissions outcomes.
In the PET model, households can affect emissions either
directly through their consumption patterns or indirectly through
their effects on economic growth in ways that up until now have
not been explicitly accounted for in emissions models. The direct
effect on emissions is represented by disaggregating household
consumption for each household type into four categories of
goods (energy, food, transport, and other) so that shifts in the
composition of the population by household type produce shifts
in the aggregate mix of goods demanded. Because different
goods have different energy intensities of production, these shifts
can lead to changes in emissions rates. To represent indirect
effects on emissions through economic growth, the PET model
explicitly accounts for the effect of (i) population growth rates on
economic growth rates (14), (ii) age structure changes on labor
supply (15), (iii) urbanization on labor productivity (16), and (iv)
anticipated demographic change (and its economic effects) on
savings and consumption behavior (17).
Thehousehold survey data thatweuse in the PETmodel (SIText)
include detailed information on income and expenditures that has
not been previously used in emissions scenarios. We estimate dif-
ferences in labor supplyandconsumptionpreferences across regions
and household types (Fig. 1). Although there are some exceptions,
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households that are older, larger, or more rural tend to have lower
per capita labor supply than those that are younger, smaller, ormore
urban. Lower-income households (e.g., rural households in de-
veloping countries) spend a larger share of income on food and
a smaller share on transportation than higher-income households.
Although labor supply and preferences can be inﬂuenced by a range
of nondemographic factors, our scenarios focus on capturing the
effects of shifts in population across types of households.
To project these demographic trends, we use the high, medium,
and low scenarios of the United Nations (UN) 2003 Long-Range
World Population Projections (18) combined with the UN 2007
Urbanization Prospects extended by the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (19) and derive population by
age, sex, and rural/urban residence for the period of 2000–2100. To
account for the impact of changes in rural/urban population age
structures in key countries, we supplement these projections
(which do not include separate urban and rural age structures)
with our own projections for China and India, using a multistate
population projection model with input assumptions based on the
UN population and urbanization scenarios. In all regions, future
population is further allocated into various types of households by
rural/urban residence, size, and age of the household head based
on projections that we carried out with an extended headship-rate
household projection model (SI Text).
Results show that, relative to the medium projection, global
population in the low and high scenarios differs by −1.5 to +1.7
billion in 2050 and −3.5 to +4.9 billion in 2100 (Fig. 2), with the
largest proportion of these differences attributable to the other
developing countries (ODC) region, India, sub-SaharanAfrica, and
China (Fig. 2 has a full set of regional deﬁnitions). Although a shift
to older and more urban household types occurs in all regions,
changes in urbanization levels are most pronounced in China, sub-
Saharan Africa, and the ODC region. Changes in household age
strongly affect the European Union (EU) and other industrialized
countries (OIC) regions as well as Latin America. Household size
changes are largest in India, ODC, and Latin America (SI Text has
further details of household projection outcomes).
To test the effects of alternative demographic futures on
emissions, we begin with two different baseline scenarios of fu-
ture emissions that account only for the effect of population size
changes, patterned after the A2 and B2 scenarios from the
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (9). As in the
original SRES scenarios, we assume that population growth is
high in the A2 scenario and medium in the B2 scenario. How-
ever, as discussed above, we do not use the population projec-
tions originally used by SRES, but rather, we substitute our own
projections based on more recent projections from the UN.
Using two baselines allows us to explore the effect of uncertainty
in future socioeconomic conditions on our results. To reproduce
key aspects of the A2 and B2 scenarios, we tune parameters that
govern the effects of technical change on the productivity of
labor and energy inputs in the PET model (SI Text has details of
the tuning procedure) such that regional per capita emissions,
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Fig. 1. Labor income per capita across household age, relative to the national mean (A), and household expenditure shares on four categories of goods (B) in
the initial year of the simulations. Results are shown for national data used to characterize model regions. In the PET model, labor income data are used in the
speciﬁcation of exogenous labor supply, and expenditure shares are used in the calibration of household consumption preference parameters (in both cases,
for household types deﬁned by age, size, and urban/rural residence; SI Text).
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gross domestic product (GDP), and primary energy use by source
match values produced by the implementation of these scenarios
in the IIASA Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and
their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) model (20).
We then produce two sets of variants of these scenarios. In
one set, we assume that population size follows the same path as
in the baseline scenarios, but we also account for the effects of
compositional change due to (i) aging alone, (ii) aging plus changes
in household size, and (iii) aging, household size, and urbanization
combined. The net effect of each factor (i.e., aging, size, and ur-
banization) is calculated by comparing results across these
three variants.
In another set of variants, we focus on the implications of al-
ternative population growth paths by testing the effect of either
a high or lowpopulation path inB2 (in contrast to themediumpath
in the baseline scenario) and a medium population path in A2 (in
contrast to the high path in the baseline scenario). We use this set
of variants to analyze the consequences of demographic change
for economic growth and emissions, including the effects of aging,
urbanization, and changes in household size. However, we do
not assume a relationship in the reverse direction (i.e., changes
in economic growth within these scenarios are not assumed to
be necessary to produce alternative population paths). Uncer-
tainty in the relationship between socioeconomic conditions
Fig. 2. Projected global totals (solid lines) and regional differences (colored bands) for population size. Individual colored bands indicate the contribution of
each region to the difference between global scenarios.
Fig. 3. Effect of population compositional change on emissions for the world (A and B) and by region (C and D; B2 scenario, 2100) in both absolute and
relative terms. Effects shown are from changes in composition by age of the household head (age), household size (size), urbanization (urban/rural), and all
three combined (combined effect). Bars show effects in the reference scenario, and uncertainty intervals show the range across all population scenarios.
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and population growth allows for a wide range of population
outcomes that can still be considered consistent with a given
economic growth path, particularly for the B2 and A2 scenarios
(21, 22).
Results
Results show that the effects of changes in population compo-
sition can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on emissions in particular
regions, separate from the effect of changes in population size.
Aging can reduce emissions in the long term by up to 20%,
particularly in industrialized country regions (Fig. 3). Aging
affects emissions in the PET model primarily through its in-
ﬂuence on labor supply. In the model, aging populations are
associated with lower labor productivity or labor force partici-
pation rates at older ages, which (ceteris paribus) leads to slower
economic growth. In contrast, urbanization can lead to an in-
crease in projected emissions by more than 25%, particularly in
developing country regions, also mainly through effects on labor
supply. The higher productivity of urban labor evident in the
household surveys implies that urbanization tends to increase
economic growth. Although other studies ﬁnd that, controlling
for income, urban living can be more energy efﬁcient (23), survey
data for urban households include income effects and therefore
result in increased emissions.
In most regions, changes in household size have little addi-
tional effect on emissions beyond those already captured by aging
(older households are also typically smaller). This result could
be because of limitations in our household projections, which in-
clude household size changes driven by aging and urbanization
but only capture the effects of behavioral change on household
size in China and the United States (SI Text has details on
household projections). In China, reduced household size leads
to lower emissions, a direction of inﬂuence counter to previous
results (2). The reduction is driven primarily by the fact that large
households in older age categories typically have greater per
capita labor supply (and income) than smaller households, be-
cause they include adult children of working age. Thus, aging,
combined with a decline in household size, leads to a reduction in
per capita labor supply as older households become composed
primarily of the elderly.
At the global level, compositional effects are largely offsetting,
although this is not true in all regions. In general, urbanization is
the dominant compositional effect on emissions in developing
countries, especially China and India, whereas aging dominates in
the industrialized countries. Results for the A2 scenario are similar
to those for B2 in percentage terms, although substantially larger in
terms of absolute emissions (SI Text has A2 results). For example,
urbanization in the A2 scenario accounts for an additional 4 billion
Fig. 4. Projected global totals (lines) and regional differences (colored bands) for CO2 emissions. Individual colored bands indicate the contribution of each
region to the difference between global scenarios. Solid lines shows emissions in the baseline scenario, and dashed lines show emissions in variants with
alternative demographic assumptions. Both types of scenarios include the effects of changes in population composition by household age, size, and urban/
rural status. Economic and technological assumptions are based on the IPCC A2 (A) and B2 (B) scenarios.
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tons of carbon per year (GtC/y; about one-half of current global
emissions) by 2100.
Results (Fig. 4) also show that if population were to follow the
low path rather than the medium in the B2 scenario, emissions
would decrease signiﬁcantly, with a global reduction of 1.4 GtC/y
in 2050 and 5.1 GtC/y in 2100. However, if population were to
follow the high projection rather than the medium, global emis-
sions would be increased by 1.7 GtC/y in 2050 and 7.3 GtC/y in
2100. Regionally, the most substantial portion of these changes in
emissions comes from the developing countries; however, the
contribution from the industrialized countries is not small. For
example, change in US population growth has a pronounced ef-
fect on emissions, despite its small contribution to global differ-
ences in population outcomes, because of the relatively high per
capita emissions implied in the B2 scenario. In the A2 scenario,
results at the global level are larger in absolute terms: reducing
population growth from the high to the medium path leads to
a reduction of 2.5 GtC/y by 2050 and 10.9 GtC/y by 2100.
Discussion
Our analysis indicates that greater attention should be given in
emissions scenarios to the implications of urbanization and ag-
ing, particularly in key regions of the world, including China,
India, the United States, and the EU. This conclusion is moti-
vated by the belief that better modeling of these trends would
improve our understanding of the potential range of future en-
ergy demand and emissions. Better understanding of how fast (or
slow) demand may grow is useful for informing response strat-
egies. However, our results do not imply that policies inﬂuencing
aging or urbanization themselves would be the most appropriate
response. A wide range of considerations must come into play in
designing mitigation strategies; the fact that a particular phe-
nomenon is a quantitatively signiﬁcant driver of emissions does
not mean that it is also an important policy lever.
In addition, it is important to keep in mind that we use a broad
deﬁnition of both urbanization and aging in this analysis. Ur-
banization, for example, is not limited to a geographic concept
related to where people live and at what population density, with
all other factors held constant. Rather, it represents both the
growth of urban populations and a set of associated economic
changes. In the PET model, urbanization has effects on labor
supply and consumption preferences and therefore on economic
growth and income. Some other analyses of the effect of ur-
banization on energy use or emissions abstract from any income
effects and aim to measure the effect only of differences in
lifestyles or consumption patterns (24–26). Thus, differences in
conclusions about the effect of urbanization can be caused in
large part by differences in the deﬁnition of urbanization.
Like urbanization, aging in this analysis is also associated with
economic changes, including those related to reduced labor sup-
ply as populations age. We have assumed here that age proﬁles
of labor supply remain constant over time at patterns observed in
current household data. If these patterns do not remain constant,
results will differ. For example, if retirement is postponed, labor
supply at older ages will increase, and the emissions-reducing
effect of aging that we ﬁnd here will be lessened.
Our results also show that reduced population growth could
make a signiﬁcant contribution to global emissions reductions.
Several analyses have estimated how much emissions would have
to be reduced by 2050 to meet long-term policy goals such as
avoiding warming of more than 2 °C (27) or preventing a doubling
of CO2 concentrations through implementation of a portfolio of
mitigation measures characterized as “stabilization wedges” (28).
Our estimate that following a lower population path could reduce
emissions 1.4–2.5 GtC/y by 2050 is equivalent to 16–29% of the
emission reductions necessary to achieve these goals or approxi-
mately 1–1.5 wedges of emissions reductions (SI Text has details of
this calculation). By the end of the century, the effect of slower
population growth would be even more signiﬁcant, reducing total
emissions from fossil fuel use by 37–41% across the two scenarios.
One caveat is that we have not made any assumptions about
how reduced population growth occurs; rather, we treat alter-
native population growth paths as exogenous. Economic de-
velopment is one factor that can facilitate declines in fertility and
slower population growth. If it were assumed that increases in
economic growth rates were driving fertility decline, our results
would differ: faster economic growth would have an upward
effect on emissions, offsetting the emissions reductions caused by
slower population growth to some degree.
However, more rapid economic development is not the only
factor, or anecessary one, in facilitating fertility decline.Policies can
also signiﬁcantly affect fertility trends. Although the appropriate-
ness of policies that encourage even lower fertility in countries
where it is already low is debatable andwould require consideration
of the tradeoffs associated with increased aging (29), in other
regions, there are several such policies already considered desirable
in their own right. For example, household surveys indicate that
there is a substantial unmet need for family planning and re-
productive health services inmany countries. Policies thatmeet this
needwould reduce current fertility by about 0.2 births perwoman in
the United States (30) and 0.6–0.7 births per woman in the de-
veloping world (SI Text has details of this calculation). This re-
duction is comparable with the 0.5 births per woman difference in
fertility assumptionsbetween thepopulation scenariosusedhere. In
our analysis, emissions reductions in these regions (i.e., the United
States and developing country regions other thanChina) amount to
about one-half of the total reductions that result from following
a lower global population growth path, suggesting that family
planningpolicieswould have a substantial environmental cobeneﬁt.
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